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5Summary 
summary
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been on the European Union’s agenda 
for decades, becoming one of the most important and controversial issues 
of EU foreign policy. Member States and EU institutions are certainly the 
main actors involved in the EU’s policy-making process towards the con-
flict. However, non-state actors (NSAs), such as business groups, NGOs, 
think tanks etc., have also become part and parcel of the process. Not 
only are they involved in the output side of EU external policy-making, as 
beneficiaries of EU funding or in implementing EU projects, but they are 
also very active on the input side, thus contributing to the formulation 
and shaping of EU external policy in this regard. 
In light of the lobbying and advocacy activities carried out by NSAs when 
it comes to EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is impor-
tant to investigate who these actors are and what role they play. In order 
to shed light on these aspects, the paper firstly presents a mapping of the 
NSAs involved in lobbying and advocacy activities in the context of EU 
policy. By offering a typology of these actors, it provides a lens through 
which the role of NSAs may be evaluated, highlighting their main features 
and core trends in their work. Secondly, the paper investigates the role 
played by these NSAs in the EU’s external policy-making process by offer-
ing examples of EU-NSA engagement. It demonstrates the key role played 
by NSAs in providing EU officials and policy-makers with information, 
raising awareness, drawing attention to events happening on the ground 
or having a bearing on the relationships between the EU and the parties, 
and offering different frames of analysis for problems and issues of EU 
interest. Moreover, NSAs can also contribute to fine-tuning existing EU 
policies towards the conflict, and indeed to changing them. 
By exploring these dynamics and the role played by NSAs, this paper aims 
to improve our understanding of the EU’s foreign policy-making process 
through the analysis of a group of actors that, although under-researched, 
play a not insignificant role in the formulation and evolution of EU ex-
ternal policy.
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The EU’s engagement with non-state actors (NSAs) – e.g. business groups, 
NGOs and think tanks – has become part and parcel of EU policy- 
making.1 EU external relations are no exception to this trend, as the case 
of EU policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shows.2 Given that 
this is one of the most extensively documented conflicts in history and 
one of the most relevant issues in EU foreign policy,3 the number of NSAs 
dealing with the conflict is significant.4 NSAs are involved on the output 
side of EU foreign policy-making, often benefiting from EU funding, be-
ing involved in EU programmes or training activities and dialogue fora 
aimed at conflict resolution or at the improvement of the situation on the 
ground in terms of human rights and democracy.5 NSAs are also active on 
the input side through lobbying and advocacy activities, as confirmed by 
many EU officials and policy-makers.6 While both dimensions are worth 
analysing, this paper focuses on the input side.7 
1.  See European Commission, Communication on General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested 
parties by the Commission, COM(2002)704, Brussels, 11 December 2002; Nathalie Tocci (ed.), The EU, Civil Society 
and Conflict (London, Routledge, 2011), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/index_en.htm.
2.  This paper does not examine the Arab-Israeli conflict, but focuses on the more limited issue of Israeli-Palestin-
ian dynamics. While the two aspects cannot be disentangled, this dimension of the conflict has been given more 
attention in EU foreign policy and by civil society and NSAs. Most of their activities revolve around Israeli-Pales-
tinian relations, while the broader Arab-Israeli dimension is less dealt with. Therefore, the author has preferred 
to concentrate attention on this aspect. 
3.  In this paper, foreign policy is defined as ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent 
actor in international relations’ (Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, Houndmills/Basingstoke, 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p. 4). Hill proposes a broad definition of foreign policy comprising both high and low 
politics and taking into consideration the actions of all governing mechanisms (ibid., pp. 4-5). This paper also 
uses the terms ‘EU policy/policies’ or ‘EU external policy/policies’ interchangeably when referring to all forms 
of foreign policy that the EU pursues towards Israel and the Palestinians. The former expression is preferred 
whenever Israel/Palestine is mentioned in the sentence, while the latter is used when this is not clearly specified. 
As said, the scope of the paper refers to EU foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and includes all 
actions and policies that the EU deploys in this regard.
4.  Interview with EU official, Brussels, February 2011.
5.  On the output side, especially on the EU’s engagement with civil society organisations in conflict situations, see 
Tocci, op. cit. in note 1; Benoit Challand, ‘Coming too late? The EU’s mixed approaches to transforming the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict’, in ibid; Nathalie Tocci and Benedetta Voltolini, The EU, Civil Society and Conflict Resolution in Israel- 
Palestine. Paper presented at the Workshop on ‘The EU and the Middle East’, EU-GRASP 7th FP, Jerusalem, 22 May 
2011.
6.  Interviews with EU officials and MEPs, February-March 2011. This paper focuses on the EU level. NSAs can 
also act at the level of Member States and use them as an indirect channel to influence EU policies. Often NSAs 
try to use all available channels, thus lobbying at both the EU and national levels.
7.  This research is based on a database compiled by the author. It also contains NSAs that are ‘potentially inter-
ested in influencing EU foreign policy’. This means that, although no specific instance of lobbying/advocacy ac-
tivities has been found so far, these actors have interests at stake in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and advocacy/
lobbying are part of their activities. Therefore, it is supposed that they could potentially be involved in EU foreign 
policy-making, if specific facts or particular interests are at stake.
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It investigates what role NSAs play in the EU’s policy-making process in 
relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and examines their interaction 
with the EU in the context of the conflict. Clearly, EU external policies 
are also influenced by the dynamics on the ground, the role played by 
the conflicting parties as well as by third actors such as the US. However, 
these aspects are not covered here.
The paper examines NSAs’ lobbying and advocacy activities and how 
NSAs try to influence EU external policy according to their goals and 
preferences. In this paper the terms ‘lobbying’ and ‘advocacy’ are used in-
terchangeably. No comparison with the lobbying in the US, where lobby-
ing is strictly regulated, or in EU Member States is made and an analytical 
rather than normative approach is taken. 
Although indirect forms of lobbying and advocacy activities targeting EU 
external policies are also possible, most notably through Member States, 
this paper only deals with the direct interactions between the EU and 
NSAs. Even though both the EU and NSAs are embedded in the conflict, 
this paper does not take a ‘conflict-driven’ point of view, but adopts in-
stead an EU focus, concentrating on the role of NSAs in EU external poli-
cies. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is taken as an exemplary case of EU 
external policy in order to point out specific dynamics in the EU policy-
making process. 
The term NSA is used as an umbrella term to encompass a variety of actors. 
By drawing on the relevant literature,8 NSAs are defined here as groups that 
are autonomous from the government (which does not mean that they can-
not receive public funding); that have a relatively formal structure; and that 
try to influence, or have a potential interest in influencing, the EU’s policy-
making process towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.9 The timeframe of 
the paper concentrates on events that have occurred since 2000. 
8.  Among others, see Bas Arts, Non-State Actors in Global Governance: Three Faces of Power, Max Planck Project Group 
on Common Goods, Bonn, Working Paper 2003/4; Jan Beyers, Rainer Eising and William Maloney (eds.), Inter-
est Group Politics in Europe (London/New York: Routledge, 2010); Daphne Josselin and William Wallace, Non-state 
Actors in World Politics (Houndmills/Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001); Ken Kollman, Outside Lobbying. Public 
Opinion & Interest Group Strategies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
9.  The Palestinian Authority (PA) is considered as a state actor, as it is the administrative body in charge of 
the government of the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the agreement reached by the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) and Israel with the Oslo Accords. The current debate about the recognition of the state of 
Palestine at the UN is also an issue pushed by the PA, but it works as a political and representational body which 
is different from the NSAs considered here. The PA deals with political power and governs a territory, even if its 
sovereignty is limited.
9Introduction 
By providing insights into the landscape of NSAs involved in the sphere 
of EU policy-making with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this 
paper aims to contribute to understanding how the EU’s policies are 
shaped, formulated and implemented. It sheds light on actors that are 
usually not taken into account in the analysis of EU policy on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, thus adding further nuances to the study of the EU’s 
external policy-making process. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, EU policy towards the conflict 
and the role played by the different actors (Member States and EU in-
stitutions) in the policy-making process are explained. Second, the 
paper analyses how the EU engages with NSAs by providing an overview 
of these actors and highlighting their main features. The third section fo-
cuses on the role played by NSAs and how they impact on the EU’s policy-
making. Finally, the conclusions summarise the main findings.
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1.   The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
1.   the eU and the israeli-Palestinian 
conflict 
the eU’s position towards the conflict and the 
parties involved
Since the early 1970s the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has featured prominent-
ly on the EU’s agenda. Over the decades the EU’s position has consolidated 
around the pursuit of two main goals, namely the two-state solution and 
respect for human rights, international humanitarian law and international 
law.10 In order to pursue these two key objectives, the EU has tackled, at least 
rhetorically, the final status issues, namely borders, settlements, refugees, 
water and security. Settlements have become a big issue for the international 
community and the EU has been quite vocal in its condemnation of them. 
The EU’s policy towards the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) is com-
plemented by its bilateral relations with the parties. Within the legal 
framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Union for the Medi-
terranean (EMP/UfM), both Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisa-
tion (PLO) have signed an Association Agreement with the EU, as part 
of the broader EU multilateral approach towards the Mediterranean re-
gion. Moreover, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans, 
signed both by Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), allow the EU to 
adopt a more differentiated approach based on the development of the 
parties and their specific needs. 
Israel enjoys more developed bilateral relations with the EU. While the up-
grade of the EU-Israel Association Agreement has been frozen since June 
2009 following Operation Cast Lead (December 2008-January 2009), in the 
tenth EU-Israel Association Council in February 2011, the EU stated that 
it is ‘prepared to further explore with Israel the opportunities still offered 
by the current Action Plan in a number of sectors and policy areas’,11 thus 
10.  Nathalie Tocci, ‘Firm in Rhetoric, Compromising in Reality: The EU in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, Ethno-
politics, vol. 8, no. 3, 2009, pp. 387-401.
11.  Tenth Meeting of the EU-Israel Association Council - Statement of the European Union, Brussels, 22 February 
2011 Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110222_01_
en.htm.
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showing its intention of deepening and strengthening its relationship 
with Israel. At the same time, however, the EU’s rhetoric has changed since 
Operation Cast Lead and Israeli internal policies have recently become an 
issue of concern, especially in light of the moves of the Netanyahu admin-
istration with regard to the Jewish identity of Israel, the restrictions on 
NGOs (e.g. the Bill on Foreign Funding of NGOs) that receive funding 
from abroad and the discrimination against the Arab minority. The EU 
has assertively reiterated that it does not recognise changes to the pre-
1967 borders and the annexation of East Jerusalem, condemning the set-
tlements and calling for the end of the blockade of Gaza, all issues that are 
seen as fundamental conditions for peace.12
As for its bilateral ties with the Palestinians, the EU was a ‘pioneer’ as it 
recognised the right of the Palestinians to self-determination in the Venice 
Declaration in 1980, which was followed by the 1999 Berlin Declaration 
supporting the creation of a Palestinian state. Not only has the EU been 
in favour of the creation of a Palestinian state, when conditions would al-
low it, but it has also supported the PA in the process of institution- and 
state-building through its financial and technical aid. In doing so, the EU 
has been implementing the policy of the Quartet, of which the EU is one 
of the members. The same applies to the EU decision to shift its attention 
towards the West Bank and the Abbas-led government, following the vic-
tory of Hamas in 2006. Yet, the EU has called for the removal of the Gaza 
blockade and has constantly supported the Palestinian population in the 
Gaza Strip by channelling direct aid, thus bypassing Hamas. 
To summarise, the EU has many stakes in the region and a primary inter-
est in the resolution of the conflict. As Rosemary Hollis has pointed out,13 
not only is the EU the largest donor to the PA, providing the money to 
pay salaries and run basic services like education and health, but it is also 
politically relevant as a member of the Quartet, the international forum 
that comprises, besides the EU, the UN, the US and Russia, and tries to 
mediate the peace process. Moreover, EU bilateral ties with the parties 
are well-developed, demonstrating the EU’s particular interest in the area. 
12.  Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, Brussels, 8 December 2009; 
Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, Brussels, 13 December 2010.
13.  Rosemary Hollis, ‘The basic stakes and strategy of the EU and Member States’, in Esra Bulut Aymat (ed.), 
‘European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, Chaillot Paper no.124, European Union Institute for Security 
Studies, Paris, December 2010.
13
1.   The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
Despite its persistent and evident involvement, the EU is often described 
as an actor with a secondary role, which is clearly reflected in references to 
the EU as a ‘payer’ instead of a ‘player’, as it invests a lot of money without 
being able to impose itself politically. This situation is also reflected in 
Costanza Musu’s description of the EU’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict as a policy of ‘converging parallels’, whereby Member States’ posi-
tions tend to get closer, but they never intersect.14 While this is the main-
stream reading of why the EU plays a secondary role, others maintain that 
the EU is a relevant actor in the conflict,15 but the rhetoric-practice gap is 
mainly explained by how and for what purpose its policy instruments are 
used.16 
In order to have a better grasp of how EU policy towards the Israeli-Pal-
estinian conflict works and understand the main aspects of the EU’s in-
volvement, the following section will offer some insights into the main ac-
tors engaged and the dynamics occurring in the policy-making process. 
Who does what in eU external policies? specific 
insights on the israeli-Palestinian conflict
EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is formulated and 
shaped by EU institutions and EU Member States. Not only do the latter 
maintain bilateral relations and a national foreign policy towards Israel 
and the Palestinians, but they are also key players in the Council of the 
European Union. This is the institution where they define the EU’s po-
litical and diplomatic stance as well as the guidelines of the EU’s policies 
with regard to both the conflict and the parties. Although Member States 
usually agree on the main aspects of the EU’s policy towards the conflict, 
on many occasions the EU only reaches ‘lowest common denominator’ 
positions that are vague and broad enough to accommodate the Mem-
ber States’ different stances. These divergences are largely determined by 
Member States’ historical past, their geopolitical interests and their con-
stituencies. An example of the predominance of Member States’ interests 
14.  Costanza Musu, European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Quicksands of Politics (Basingstoke/
New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010). Musu explains this situation by referring to three factors, namely the in-
terests of Member States, the instruments at the EU’s disposal and the relationship with the US.
15.  See Esra Bulut Aymat (ed.), ‘European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, Chaillot Paper no. 124, Paris, 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2010.
16.  Tocci, op.cit. in note 10; Nathalie Tocci, ‘The conflict and EU-Israeli relations’, in Chaillot Paper no. 124, op. 
cit. in note 13, pp. 55-64.
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is clear in the case of the December 2009 Council Conclusions, when the 
Swedish presidency tried to insert a reference to East Jerusalem as the cap-
ital of the future Palestinian state. However, the final document did not 
make any reference to it, opting for a watered down formulation based on 
the usual wording referring to Jerusalem as the capital of both states.17
EU institutions are also important players in the policy-making process, 
especially in those areas of policy where the EU has exclusive or mixed 
competences (such as trade and aid). While the political direction is given 
by the Council, the Commission has always played an important role in 
EU external policies. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the 
Directorate-General for External Relations (DG Relex) in the Commis-
sion had three desks dealing respectively with EU bilateral relations to 
Israel (Desk Israel), to the West Bank and Gaza (Desk Occupied Pales-
tinian Territories - OPTs) and with the Middle East Peace Process (Desk 
Middle East Peace Process – MEPP). Today these desks have been merged 
with the parallel desks of the former Directorate-General (DG) E in the 
Council (also dealing with external relations) and have become part of 
the EEAS. They are tasked with the daily liaison with and involvement of 
the Israeli and Palestinian counterparts and with the preparation of the 
relevant material and documentation that is necessary in the formulation 
and implementation of policies. The High Representative of the EU for 
Foreign Policy, a double-hatted figure who is also Vice-President of the 
Commission, embodies the attempt to unify all external relations under 
the same umbrella in order to attain more coherent and consistent exter-
nal policies. 
The Commission’s involvement on matters related to the conflict and 
bilateral relations with Israel and Palestine usually occurs at the more 
technical level of specific agreements or via the provision of financial as-
sistance. For example, DG Trade is involved in the drafting of trade and 
commercial agreements between the EU and Israel or the PA/PLO, while 
EuropeAid delivers aid through a series of financial instruments aimed at 
promoting human rights, good governance, democracy, etc. 
17.  For the draft text, see ‘EU draft document on division of Jerusalem’, Haaretz, 3 December 2009; for the final 
version, see Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, Brussels, 8 Decem-
ber 2009.
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The European Parliament (EP), for long marginalised in EU external re-
lations, has acquired new legislative powers with the Lisbon Treaty. The 
new provisions increase the EP’s competences in several domains, among 
which commercial policies and the conclusion of agreements with third 
parties. Diplomatically, its resolutions, although they do not equate with 
the Council’s positions, play a role on the international stage, represent-
ing one of the voices of the EU. Moreover, the EP is extremely important 
in ensuring the accountability of the other EU institutions through writ-
ten and oral questions to both the Council and the Commission request-
ing explanations over specific policies, issues and positions. 
Important actors also are the EU Delegations to respectively Israel and 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which are formally part of the EEAS. To-
gether with Member States’ embassies and consulates on the ground, they 
are intermediaries between the parties on the ground and the EU. Thanks 
to their location, they have their fingers on the pulse and are aware of 
what is happening in Israel and Palestine. Therefore, they can transmit 
important information to Brussels that can feed into the policy-making 
process. An example is offered by the Heads of Mission (HoMs) reports,18 
short documents prepared together by the EU Delegation and the Mem-
ber States’ representations in which relevant issues (e.g. East Jerusalem) 
are highlighted and recommendations for action are suggested. 
As shown, EU policies with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are 
quite diverse and several actors are involved. Where do NSAs fit into this 
picture? The following section will point to the main trends and relevant 
aspects concerning their role in EU external action.
18.  The HoMs reports are documents drafted by the Heads of Mission in non-EU countries in which issues of 
concerns for the EU and information (such as data, figures, etc.) are presented. The HoMs reports also provide 
recommendations concerning what the EU should do to address the situation on the ground. Cf. Federica Bicchi, 
‘The EU as a community of practice: foreign policy communications in the COREU network’, Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 8, 2011, pp. 1115-32.
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2.   non-state actors and eU external 
policies
The EU values the engagement with NSAs as an important component 
of its policies. On the input side, consultations with civil society actors 
and interested parties in the initial stages of the legislative process gives 
the EU the possibility to formulate policies that take into account the 
needs of the stakeholders, thus increasing its input legitimacy.19 On the 
output side, NSAs benefit from or are the targets of programmes and 
funding opportunities provided by the EU under different headings 
(e.g. research, aid).20
External policies are no exception to this trend. In the case of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict, numerous NSAs carry out lobbying and advocacy 
activities to influence EU policies toward the conflict, especially by 
providing information and expertise.21 Due to the relatively limited 
number of staff working on the conflict in the EU institutions, the 
NSAs’ contribution plays an important role in their work.22 Some NSAs 
offer technical expertise related to specific agreements and issues, 
others offer first-hand information concerning the situation on the 
ground, while some others point out to specific problems or draw of-
ficials’ attention to certain aspects. It should be kept in mind that each 
NSA is a bearer of specific interests and biases, and that information 
and knowledge are often used instrumentally to present or support 
certain ideas and visions. Nevertheless, by offering first-hand informa-
tion, analyses or reports and by pointing to specific issues (even if in a 
partial or biased way), NSAs focus EU attention on certain aspects of 
the situation. It is then up to EU policy-makers and officials to decide 
19.  Barbara Finke, ‘Civil society participation in EU governance’, Living Reviews in European Governance, vol. 2, no.  2, 
2007, available at: http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2007-2; Beate Kohler-Koch and Barbara Finke, ‘The Insti-
tutional Shaping of EU-Society Relations: A Contribution to Democracy via Participation’, Journal of Civil Society, 
vol. 3, no. 3, 2007, pp. 205-11.
20.  E.g., the Framework Programme and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). 
See Communication on General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, op. 
cit. in note 3.
21.  According to interviews, lobbying and advocacy is comparatively more developed in relation to this issue than 
in other areas of intense lobbying activities such as the People’s Mujahedin of Iran or the Western Sahara. Inter-
view with EU official, Brussels, February 2011.
22.  Interviews with EU officials, Brussels, February-October 2011.
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how to use this material. Information and knowledge23 are provided, 
informally, in meetings with officials, via emails, reports and other 
written material that present the view of NSAs. At a more institution-
alised and formal level, NSAs are also invited to parliamentary hear-
ings or formal consultations (the consultation on the revision of the 
ENP, meetings before the EU-Israel or EU-PLO Association Council/
Committee meetings), when they have to express their views on spe-
cific issues.24
On the output side, NSAs are involved in their implementation of EU 
policies on the ground. NSAs can be directly affected by these policies, 
such as in cases of commercial agreements, which have an impact on 
business groups that have to abide by the new provisions in place. Al-
ternatively, NSAs can be part and parcel of the EU approach to conflict 
resolution, thus being engaged via dialogue, training and funding. Dia-
logue is aimed at fostering mutual understanding between the parties 
on the ground and favouring socialisation processes leading to the de-
velopment of common values, new ideas and different forms of under-
standing and management of the conflict. As for the funding, the EU 
offers several opportunities to NGOs that can submit applications for 
being financed under different instruments and programmes, such as 
the Partnership for Peace Programmes and the European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Finally, the EU can engage 
with civil society organisations (CSOs) by funding training activities that 
are implemented by local or international actors. Training is also aimed 
at governments and public administrations, with CSOs working as the 
go-between. For example, the EU funded the Seyada programme, which 
was aimed at the empowerment of the judicial system in Palestine. Civil 
society actors were involved to the extent that the project targeted not 
only state personnel, but also the broader legal community comprising 
scholars, researchers and students. Moreover, the implementation was 
carried out by three international NGOs, namely the ICON Institute 
23.  While these words are mainly used interchangeably in the paper, information refers to data that reduce uncer-
tainty and ambiguity, while knowledge relates to the interpretation of information and beliefs about ‘cause-effect’ 
relations (cf. George P. Huber, ‘Organisational learning: The contributing process and the literatures’, Organisation 
Science, vol. 2, 1991, pp. 88-115; p. 89).
24.  It is important to point out that lobbying and advocacy activities are also a way for NSAs to show that they 
are active, that it is worth financing them and that this money is well spent. Therefore, lobbying the EU is also an 
activity of NSAs that is linked to their survival. This does not deny the rationality of actors, who plan and tailor 
their actions so that these are as effective as possible. Cf. David Lowery, ‘Why Do Organised Interests Lobby? A 
Multi-goal, Multi-context Theory of Lobbying’, Polity, vol. 39, no. 1, 2007, pp. 29–54.
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Public Sector GmbH, the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) and the 
Centre for International Legal Cooperation. Clearly, the involvement of 
CSOs critically depends on the type of training activities and the target 
audiences at which it is aimed.25 
25.  Tocci, op. cit. in note 1; Tocci and Voltolini, op. cit. in note 5. 
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3.   Mapping non-state actors in 
eU policies towards the israeli-
Palestinian conflict
The NSAs involved in lobbying and advocacy activities with regard to EU 
policy towards the conflict are very diverse, but they all share the view 
that the EU can play a role in the conflict and that its policies can be in-
fluenced.26 Although many NSAs often complain about the EU’s rhetoric-
practice gap when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they still try 
to influence EU policies in the belief that the EU has the potential and the 
tools to exert leverage on Israel and the Palestinians. 
This section provides the reader with a typology of the NSAs interested in 
influencing EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and some 
of their key characteristics, before moving to an analysis of their lobbying 
and advocacy activities in section 4.
Methodologically, this mapping exercise has relied on a variety of sources. 
First, the registers of the Commission and the EP and, since June 2011, the 
Transparency Register have been consulted. Second, NSAs have also been 
identified through the literature, reports and studies.27 Newspaper arti-
cles, some scholarly articles and some books28 provide some of the names 
of NSAs involved in lobbying activities. Third, the database has been in-
tegrated through interviews with NSAs themselves and EU officials and 
policy-makers.29 The information collected through these sources has 
been cross-checked and the database, as of mid-October 2011, contains 
around 270 NSAs. The lack of systematic sources to rely on makes it dif-
ficult to have a complete and exhaustive picture of the entire NSA popu-
lation. Indeed, the registers of the Commission and the EP, which were 
separate until the introduction of the Transparency Register in 2011, were 
26.  Interviews with NSA representatives, November 2010-October 2011.
27.  For example, Marloes Van Kuppevelt, Stakeholders Analysis: European Policy on the Middle East. IKV Pax Christi. May 
2009 (unpublished); see also, among others, various reports by Profundo, Corporate Watch and Who Profits.
28.  E.g. David Cronin, Europe’s Alliance with Israel (London: Pluto Press, 2010).
29.  On the “snowball effect”, see Piergiorgio Corbetta, Social Research: Theory, Methods and Techniques (London: 
SAGE, 2003). Interviews carried out between November 2010 and October 2011. 
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structured in different ways and served different purposes. The former 
was voluntary, while the latter contained all the people that required a 
permanent badge to enter the European Parliament premises, which did 
not necessarily translate into the identification of all (or only) interest rep-
resentatives. Similarly, the Transparency Register is not compulsory and 
NSAs are forced to register only if they want an annual badge to access the 
EP. However, access can be obtained via alternative channels, such as ar-
ranging meetings with officials. Thus, the non-registration does not pre-
clude the possibility of NSAs meeting officials and politicians from both 
institutions.30 Nevertheless, the database built offers interesting insights 
into the NSA population interested in influencing EU policy towards the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In order to add clarity to this diverse group, 
the following typology helps to identify the different types of NSAs and 
to highlight their features.
a typology of non-state actors involved in eU policies 
towards the conflict 
The NSAs relevant to this study are very diverse in terms of their nature, 
their organisational structure, their objectives, their location and their 
lobbying strategies. While all these features offer alternative perspec-
tives from which to look at the landscape of these NSAs, this section 
develops a typology based on NSAs’ core activity, i.e., the main activity 
that characterises their work. A typology is necessarily a simplification 
of the reality, as it draws clear-cut distinctions among different types 
of NSAs. The latter often have a hybrid nature, carrying out a variety 
of activities. For example, both think tanks and some NGOs carry out 
research, but the former conduct research as their main activity, while 
NGOs use it in support of other core activities. Therefore, this typol-
ogy should only be considered as a possible lens through which NSAs 
can be organised in order to deepen our understanding of the similari-
30.  On the problem of mapping/counting interest groups, see also Joost Berkhout and  David Lowery, ‘Counting 
organised interests in the European Union: A comparison of data source’, Journal of Public Policy, vol. 15, no. 4, 
2008, pp.489-513. As for the registers of the EU, the Commission’s register of Interest Representatives used to 
contain different types of information according to each NSA. In contrast, the EP register was only a list of names 
with their affiliation. Yet, due to the voluntary nature of these registers as well as the presence of alternative 
channels to get access to policy-makers and officials, these registers never entailed a detailed and complete list 
of NSAs. Indeed, in the Commission and the EEAS access is granted on the basis of a daily pass, when a meeting 
with one of the officials is arranged. As for the EP, it is possible to get access by arranging meetings with MEPs 
and officials or by asking someone working in the EP to be signed in. Although the Transparency Register links 
registration with the granting of an annual badge for the EP, registration remains voluntary and both the Com-
mission/EEAS and EP premises can be accessed through daily passes.
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ties and differences of NSAs and how their engagement with the EU 
works. 
Five main categories have been identified, namely NGOs, business groups 
or economic-oriented actors, solidarity or protest movements, think tanks, 
and the media. As shown in Graph 1, the majority of NSAs are NGOs (49 
percent), followed by business groups (30 percent). The other categories 
are much smaller, with solidarity/protest movements representing 11 per-
cent, think tanks 6 percent and the media only 4 percent of NSAs. 
Graph 1: Frequency of NSAs relevant to this study, divided by category
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Non-Governmental Organisations
NGOs are the most active NSAs in lobbying and advocacy regarding the is-
sue of the EU’s policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.31 Defined here 
as not-for-profit groups that are law-abiding (i.e., they abide by the law of 
the country in which they are based/operate and do not commit criminal 
actions) and that do not seek to overthrow the government or to acquire 
state power,32 NGOs are mainly concerned with the delivery of services or 
advocacy activities. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, most of 
them concentrate their activities on human rights (e.g. Adalah, the Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network – EMHRN), on social and develop-
mental matters (e.g. Aprodev), on environmental issues (e.g. Friends of the 
Earth Middle East), on the problems associated with the conflict such as 
house demolition, prisoners, etc. (e.g. Ir Amim), and on Israel and the Jew-
ish people (e.g. European Friends of Israel, NGO Monitor). Besides the dif-
ferent areas of work, NGOs also display different features in terms of their 
size, their location and their organisational structure. 
Among the numerous NGOs that play a role, there is a ‘core’ of actors 
that are mentioned frequently by stakeholders as having more contacts 
with EU policy-makers or making important contributions to their work. 
These include, among others, Amnesty International, Aprodev, EMHRN, 
CIDSE, the European Friends of Israel, European Jewish Congress, Hu-
man Rights Watch, Mossawa Center, Adalah, Breaking the Silence, and 
B’Tselem. The Brussels-based community of NGOs dealing with the 
conflict is even smaller, so that people generally know each other. NGO 
networks, such as Crisis Action, have been established in Brussels, as 
have advocacy offices of umbrella organisations such as EMHRN and 
Aprodev.
31.  Interviewees in EU institutions usually named NGOs as the most active NSAs. Interviews carried out between 
February and October 2011.
32.  A clear-cut definition of NGOs is no mean feat. On the one hand, legal definitions are not of much help, as 
each state has different laws regulating the status of NGOs. On the other hand, there is a huge debate in the 
literature concerning the definition of NGOs which is often related to the disciplinary angle adopted. The defi-
nition chosen for this paper identifies those features that make it possible to distinguish NGOs from business 
groups, criminal organisations, armed groups, liberation movements and political parties. See Menno T. Kam-
minga, ‘The evolving status of NGOs under international law: a threat to the inter-state system?’, in Philip Alston, 
Non-state actors and human rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.93-111; Kerstin Martens, ‘Mission 
impossible? Defining Nongovernmental organisations’, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Or-
ganizations, vol. 13, no. 3, 2002, pp. 271-85. 
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Solidarity and protest movements 
The category of solidarity and protest movements displays similar fea-
tures to those of NGOs, but they are generally less structured, they adopt 
loose forms of organisation and they rely on the work done on a voluntary 
basis by their members. Their strength depends on their ability to mobi-
lise people and public opinion through campaigns and demonstrations 
in order to exert pressure on policy-makers through this channel. Due to 
the nature of their activities, they are mainly organised and active at the 
national level, as it is easier to raise the attention of public opinion at the 
national level than at the wider EU level. Examples of solidarity/protest 
movements are the Ireland-Palestine Solidarity Campaign or Campagne 
pour la protection du peuple palestinien. Nevertheless, there are some 
solidarity/protest movements that are also active at the European and 
transnational level, working principally on the basis of national move-
ments that are then coordinated at a higher level. For example, this is the 
case of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, which is 
international in its scope (meaning that it pursues a common campaign 
internationally), but operates on the basis of national branches. 
Business groups
As for the category of business groups or economic-oriented actors, they 
perform economic activities aimed at increasing their market share and 
making their business more profitable. They range from multinational 
corporations to relatively small businesses, and they work in very different 
sectors, such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals, defence, etc.33 Usually business 
groups try to avoid any political involvement and concentrate their actions 
on the economic and technical aspects of EU policies. Unlike NGOs that 
tend to work on issues that are ‘ongoing’ such as justice, development, con-
flict resolution, respect for human rights and international law, business 
groups focus their lobbying efforts on specific issues and at specific times. 
Examples include the case of Brita GmhB concerning the import of goods 
from the settlements or of Teva with regard to the Agreement on Conform-
ity Assessment and Acceptance of pharmaceutical goods exported from Is-
rael to the EU and vice versa. This different type of lobbying is also a possible 
33.  In the database, there is a bias concerning the groups listed due to the data available, which mainly focus on 
some countries (especially the UK and the Netherlands) and not on others. Interviews have been used to find out 
more information concerning this category of NSAs and to limit the impact of the bias as much as possible.
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explanation of why there are fewer examples of business groups lobbying 
the EU to influence its policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.34
Think tanks
The fourth category is formed by think tanks.35 Their main activity re-
volves around research aimed at influencing the policy-making process 
by generating and shaping the debate through ideas, inputs, etc. For ex-
ample, NSAs such as the Centre of European Policy Studies (CEPS) or 
International Crisis Group produce reports and policy papers with policy 
recommendations or they organise workshops and seminars to create a 
debate on EU policies and foster change. Even if many of them are legally 
registered as NGOs and there are also NGOs that put a lot of emphasis on 
research, think tanks make research their core activity, as they ‘produce 
and principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influ-
ence the policymaking process.’36
Media 
Finally, the media are also part of the NSAs’ landscape, as they contrib-
ute to the debate within EU institutions and Member States and they 
shape the discussion at the level of public opinion. Besides newspapers 
and broadcasts, which are clearly the main channels of transmission of in-
formation and influence on the public debate, there are some NSAs that 
specifically deal with the media and the presentation of information and 
topics related to the conflict. Unlike other NSAs, their main activity re-
lates to communication and media-related work. In this way, they are try-
ing to indirectly influence policy-makers and officials. Playing certainly 
34.  There are other possible explanations, e.g. they lobby at the national level or their interests are not affected by 
EU policies, as their sectors of activities are not regulated by the EU.
35.  Foundations, especially German foundations such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, are here considered as part of the ‘think tank’ category. While their nature is quite complex, as they 
perform different kinds of activities (not only research), when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, most 
foundations work to generate and stimulate debate and to provide information and researched documents to 
shape and influence policies. In this way, their work is very similar to that of think tanks. 
36.  Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), p. 11. On think tanks, see also Diane Stone, Think Tank Transnationalisation and Non-Profit Analysis, Advice and 
Advocacy, Global Development Network, 2000. Available at: www.eldis.org/fulltext/thinktank.pdf. Andrew Rich 
also argues that think tanks are often perceived as more credible in the eyes of policy-makers, as they do not usu-
ally represent a specific constituency. However, the neutrality of certain think tanks can be questioned, as they 
also support specific visions. As many think tanks are registered as NGOs, in this paper research-driven NGOs 
are classified as think tanks on the basis of the type of research they produce and its relevance among all other 
activities that they carry out. For example, International Crisis Group is here considered as a think tank, because 
research is their core activity and it corresponds to most features of Rich’s definition.
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an important role at both the EU and Member State level, media-focused 
NSAs are generally more active, and their presence is more visible, at the 
national level. Examples of these NSAs are Inform, Bicom and JNews.37 
Geographic distribution of relevant nsas 
The NSAs relevant to this study are not only located in the EU, but many of 
them are also based in Israel/Palestine or have a cross-national and trans- 
national outreach. As Graph 2 shows, the majority of NSAs are either EU-
based (44 percent) or have a cross-country presence (35 percent), i.e., they 
have offices in different countries. This usually means that they have a pres-
ence both in Brussels and on the ground or at least that they are present in 
several countries and that they are of a sufficiently large size to ensure that 
they can have some leverage when it comes to lobbying the EU. 
Graph 2: Frequency of NSAs relevant to this study, by location.
Note: ‘Others’ includes those NSAs that are not included in the other categories (e.g. based 
in Lebanon or only in the US, etc.) and those whose location has not been found.
37.  On the role played by the media, see for example Peter Oborne and James Jones, The pro-Israel lobby in Britain, 
OpenDemocracy, 2009. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/peter-oborne-james-jones/
pro-israel-lobby-in-britain-full-text.
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The location of NSAs clearly has an impact on their activities and their 
outreach capacity. Needless to say, Brussels-based actors (those who have 
an office or a person based there) are in a privileged position to interact 
with EU institutions. It is easier for them to be involved in the EU’s policy-
making process, to be informed about what is going on, to act on short 
notice, to collect information, and to know how to carry out more effec-
tive lobbying and advocacy work (e.g. which institutions are better lobby-
ing targets). As shown in Graph 3, 28 percent of the NSAs in the database 
are present in Brussels. The remaining 72 percent is located elsewhere, 
coming to Brussels when lobbying and advocacy activities so require or 
relying on umbrella organisations and networks based there. 
Graph 3: Presence in Brussels of the NSAs relevant to this study.
Note: ‘Presence in Brussels’ means that NSAs have an office there or a person based there.
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At the same time, being present on the ground is also an asset for NSAs, 
as they can provide the EU with first-hand information and highlight 
what the main issues for NSAs in Israel/Palestine are. These actors are 
often considered the voices of local civil society and the information and 
knowledge they provide is often considered important by EU officials and 
policy-makers.38 Moreover, they can have access to the EU through the EU 
Delegations and the Member States’ Embassies and Consulates on the 
ground, which represent important channels through which NSAs can 
pass information and put forward their requests and needs. 
To obviate problems of location and to exploit individual NSA’s poten-
tial and capacities, Brussels hosts many umbrella organisations, such as 
EMHRN or Aprodev, comprising and representing different EU- and/or 
Israel/Palestine-based NGOs in EU institutions. Similarly, the European 
Jewish Congress represents European Jewish communities based in Euro-
pean states in the EU. A virtual presence in Brussels has also been made 
possible by the internet, which makes it possible for many NSAs to have 
a broad outreach in terms of spreading their messages, requests and in-
formation. NSAs’ websites are used to increase their public profile, to dis-
seminate information, and to present views and ideas on issues of their 
interest. Informative material can also be rapidly circulated via emails and 
mailing lists. 
As shown in this section, the NSAs relevant to this study are very different 
in terms of their nature, location and areas of work. What do they do in 
terms of lobbying and advocacy activities? Examples in this regard will be 
the subject of the following section.
38.  Interviews with EU officials, Brussels,  February-October 2011. EU officials usually express positive opinions 
about the information and expertise provided by NSAs. Although they might trust some organisations more than 
others, they are generally open to inputs from civil society actors. Information is then double-checked with other 
sources in order to have a clearer picture of the situation on the ground.

31
4.   Non-state actors at work: lobbying and advocacy in practice 
4.   non-state actors at work: lobbying 
and advocacy in practice
some general trends in non-state actors’ interaction 
with the eU
The interaction between NSAs and EU actors on matters of EU policies to-
wards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict presents some general features. First, 
this interaction occurs in a polarised context, overshadowed, in the case of 
the European Parliament, by institutional fatigue. Second, targets of lob-
bying as well as various forms of cooperation and coordination emerge. 
Finally, there are three main different strategies (access, voice, litigation) 
that NSAs adopt when carrying out lobbying and advocacy work.
The context of interaction 
The context in which lobbying and advocacy activities take place is very 
polarised and politicised. As a consequence of the ongoing conflict, NSAs 
take different and sometimes opposing stances and pursue different 
goals. Yet, this polarisation does not take the form of pro-Israel and pro-
Palestinian NSAs, implying an opposition between Israelis and Palestin-
ians (or between those supporting one of the two sides). Not only is this 
dichotomy rejected by most NSAs, policy-makers and officials working 
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,39 but a careful analysis of the activities 
of NSAs, of their websites, statutes, etc., indicates a nuanced landscape 
that goes beyond it. Indeed, many EU-based or transnational organisa-
tions tend to carry out advocacy activities based on the respect for human 
rights and international law, avoiding taking a political stance of direct 
support for either the Palestinians or Israel. For example, some of them 
denounce violations of human rights and international law by both Israel 
and Fatah/Hamas, without favouring any of the parties of the conflict (e.g. 
Amnesty International, FIDH). Similarly, those NGOs belonging to the 
Israeli peace camp are a category ‘in the middle’, as, in the name of Israel’s 
interests and security, they work to improve the situation in the OPTs and 
39.  Interviews with NSA representatives and EU officials, November 2010-October 2011.
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ensure that Israeli policies towards the Palestinians comply with interna-
tional law, international humanitarian law and human rights. 
The polarisation can be better described in terms of the following two 
approaches to the EU adopted by NSAs . One side asks the EU to exert 
pressure on the parties to respect human rights, humanitarian law and 
international law. Most of the NSAs belonging to this camp call for the 
adoption of a tough stance against Israel due to its policies in the OPTs 
in violation of its obligations under international and humanitarian law. 
The other side pushes for the improvement and deepening of EU-Israeli 
bilateral relations, disentangling the conflict from the bilateral ties. Most 
of these NSAs justify their requests on the basis of Israeli democratic 
credentials and the weight of European history (the Holocaust and anti-
Semitism). 
In part as a reflection of this polarisation, many officials and policy- 
makers in the EU already hold strong beliefs and opinions on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. This is also determined by the sensitivity of the is-
sue and its political and ideological implications. All of this is evidently 
reflected in the European Parliament, in which profound institutional 
fatigue concerning Israeli-Palestinian issues is also present due to the 
‘crystallisation’ of the conflict, the lack of any progress towards a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict and the perception of the conflict as an intermi-
nable and never-ending issue.40
Trends in NSA actions
As a probable consequence of this polarisation and of the strong beliefs 
that some EU officials and policy-makers hold, NSAs tend to focus their 
lobbying and advocacy towards those people that share their views or are, 
at least, sympathetic to them. This trend is particularly evident in the EP, 
where some MEPs, whose ideas with regard to the conflict are known, 
are almost never approached by those NSAs that hold the opposite po-
sition. The same applies to those officials working for those political 
groups whose position in this regard is clear (e.g. EFD, GUE/NGL).41 This 
reflects a strategic choice of ‘alliance building’ with those officials and 
40.  Interview with EU official, Brussels, October 2011.
41.  Interviews with MEP, Brussels, March and June 2011.
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policy-makers that share and support the NSA’s positions in order to get 
involved in the policy-making process. 
Cooperation and coordination among NSAs, especially among NGOs, is 
another interesting trend. The Brussels-based NGOs tend to form a rela-
tively small community that cooperate and apply a ‘division of labour’ 
in practice.42 This allows them to maximise their resources, avoid overlap-
ping in their activities, exploit each NSA’s expertise, work on several top-
ics at the same time and present a stronger and unified voice to the EU. 
For example, the EMHRN has focused on the Goldstone Report, while 
Crisis Action led the advocacy work on the blockade of Gaza. The degree 
and depth of coordination among NGOs varies, as it depends on the ar-
eas of work of NGOs, their mandates and their priorities. For example, 
some NSAs focus only on the Middle East or conflict-related issues (e.g. 
B’Tselem, European Friends of Israel), while others have broader man-
dates, so that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is only one of the issues they 
deal with (e.g. Oxfam, Amnesty International). Moreover, some actors 
look at the conflict from a human rights perspective (e.g. Amnesty Inter-
national, EMHRN), while others see it from a development perspective 
(e.g. CIDSE, Aprodev). At the same time, some focus on broad themes like 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law, while others deal with 
specific issues such as military refuseniks (e.g. Breaking the Silence) or the 
rights of the Arab Israelis (e.g. Mossawa). In the same way, some issues are 
always present on the agenda (e.g. settlements, prisoners), while others are 
dictated by events or by what is considered a burning issue (e.g. Goldstone 
Report, Israeli NGO bills). 
There is less evidence of business groups’ lobbying activities. Their par-
ticipation in the policy-making process occurs at specific times usually 
linked to the commercial and economic aspects of EU external policies: 
they take part in the consultation processes when agreements with third 
parties are under discussion or they lobby EU officials and policy-makers 
when they want to push through an agreement or to have specific points 
inserted in the text. Yet, most of the time business groups are relatively 
‘silent’. According to some interviewees, this is probably due to the lack of 
economic relevance of Israel/Palestine. On the one hand, Palestine has a 
42.  There are around 40 NGOs working on Israeli-Palestinian issues with a presence in Brussels. However, the 
community mentioned here refers to a smaller group of around 15 NGOs that interact on a more systematic 
basis.
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very small market with very fragile institutional features and little oppor-
tunity for business; on the other hand, Israel is considered as a ‘small fish’, 
i.e., a market that is very small and less interesting than China or the US. 
Other interviewees argue that business groups do not need to lobby the 
EU because the context for doing business is already favourable to them, 
without particular obstacles or specific needs to be addressed. Others also 
add that it is more likely that business groups lobby their governments, 
meaning that they ask their governments to support their interests in Is-
rael/Palestine also at the EU level, as they can exert stronger leverage and 
be thus more effective.43 
Lobbying and advocacy strategies: access, voice and litigation 
NSAs’ lobbying and advocacy strategies can be categorised in terms of 
three main approaches: access, voice and litigation.44 An access strategy con-
sists in inside lobbying based on the ‘exchange of policy-relevant infor-
mation with public officials through formal and informal networks’.45 
Although NSAs can still offer value-loaded arguments or frame issues in 
ways that fit their purposes, they need to establish their reputation vis-
à-vis policy-makers. Examples of this approach are the MATTIN Group’s 
work on settlement goods or Crisis Action’s activities aimed at provid-
ing policy-makers and officials with relevant information on, inter alia, 
the situation in Gaza. Voice approaches are public political strategies tak-
ing place ‘in various public spheres, an arena where the communication 
among societal interests, policy-makers and citizens becomes visible to 
a broader audience’.46 Voice strategies can either expand the conflict in 
order to convince policy-makers that they do not have the support of 
the base (protest politics) as many solidarity movements do, or provide 
information that reaches the public at large through conferences, op-eds, 
etc. (information politics).47 For example, the Council for European Pal-
estinian Relations (CEPR) and ECCP published an opinion article in the 
43.  Interviews with EU officials and policy-makers, February-October 2011.
44.  On this topic, see among others Pieter Bouwen, ‘Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of 
Access’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 9, no. 3, 2002, pp.365-90; Jan Beyers, ‘Voice and access: Political 
practices of European interest associations’, European Union Politics, vol. 5, no. 2, 2004, pp. 211-240; Kollman, op. 
cit. in note 8; Pieter Bouwen and Margaret McCown, ‘Lobbying versus litigation: Political and legal strategies of 
interest representation in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 14, no. 3, 2007, pp. 422-43.
45.  Beyers, op. cit. in note 44, p. 213.
46.  Ibid.
47.  Beyers, op. cit. in note 44.
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EUobserver on 23 April 2012, on the Agreement on Conformity Assess-
ment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) between the EU and 
Israel; and the EMHRN, together with Adalah and the Arab Association 
for Human Rights, organised a public launch of its report, ‘The EU and 
the Palestinian Arab Minority’, in February 2011.48 The third approach 
consists in litigation, i.e. the recourse to the court to change a piece of leg-
islation or the pattern of development of a policy, as the example of Brita 
GmbH in the next section will show.49 As these three approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, many NSAs rely on a combination of them (especially 
access and voice strategies) in order to increase their chances of success, 
increase the scope of their action and target different audiences at the 
same time. 
In light of the trends and strategies in NSAs’ lobbying and advocacy ac-
tivities identified in this section, what is the role of NSAs in EU policy-
making towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? While it is difficult to as-
sess NSAs’ impact on EU policy-making as it is difficult to disentangle the 
different factors contributing to EU external policy-making, NSAs’ role in 
the process is recognised by EU officials and policy-makers.50 The rest of 
the paper analyses how NSAs interact with the EU and what role they have 
in EU policy-making towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
non-state actors in action: their role in the policy-
making process
NSAs play a role in the policy-making process by providing information, 
raising awareness, setting the agenda, framing issues through different 
lenses, and pushing for policy fine-tuning or change. While these stages 
of the policy cycle are identified as distinct categories here for analytical 
purposes, they are often interlinked and entangled in practice. 
48.  Katarzyna Lemanska and Stuart Reigeluth, ‘Why EU should reject new Israeli trade pacts’, EUobserver, 23 April 
2012. Available at: http://euobserver.com/7/115991; on the EMHRN report and public launch see http://www.
euromedrights.org/en/publications-en/emhrn-publications/emhrn-puplications/9132.html.
49.  Bouwen and McCown, op. cit. in note 44.
50.  Interviews with EU officials and policy-makers, Brussels, February-October 2011.
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Provision of information 
By providing data, figures, concrete evidence and details on specific is-
sues, NSAs provide EU officials and policy-makers with items of informa-
tion that can be used in their daily work, e.g. in drafting reports, prepar-
ing documents for meetings with the counterparts or issuing declarations 
and resolutions.51 Although information is never neutral and it is used in-
strumentally in the conflict, many EU officials and policy-makers con-
sider these pieces of information as an added-value to their work. Some of 
them even contact NSAs when they need certain types of information.52
NSAs from Israel/Palestine, especially NGOs, have first-hand information 
that points to the problems on the ground and highlights aspects that oth-
er organisations or EU staff would find it difficult to discern. For instance, 
the work done by NGOs on settlements is very important, as they have 
a good understanding of the situation on the ground and offer updated 
data on Israeli settlements in the OPTs.53 In this regard, the Israeli NGO 
Peace Now draws detailed maps of the settlements and offers updates 
about new developments or specific cases, information that other actors 
and even international organisations might have difficulty in collecting. 
Another instance of the NGOs’ provision of information is offered by the 
database Who Profits?, run by the Coalition of Women for Peace, in which 
business groups involved in Israeli occupation policies are listed. The data-
base is complemented by detailed case studies of the activities of some of 
the listed business groups that are published on the website and electroni-
cally circulated. This offers EU officials and policy-makers a picture of the 
involvement of the private sector in the OPTs and can be used as a basis to 
develop policies or initiatives to tackle this problem. NGOs have also been 
very vocal with regard to the ‘NGO bills’54 discussed in the Israeli Knesset. 
By meeting with the EEAS and providing detailed information with regard 
to the consequences of this bill for NGOs on the ground and external do-
nors such as the EU, they supported the work of the EU when it addressed 
its concerns to the Israeli government on this matter. 
51.  Interviews with EU officials and policy-makers, Brussels, February-October 2011.
52.  Interviews with EU officials and policy-makers, Brussels, February-October 2011.
53.  Interviews with EU officials, Brussels, February-October 2011.
54.  The ‘NGO bill’ aims at imposing specific requirements and limitations on those NGOs receiving money from 
foreign governments and international institutions. In contrast, NGOs being funded via foreign private money 
are not subject to this regulation. This has been considered as a discriminatory measure as it limits the freedom 
of the former NGOs.
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Raising awareness 
Linked to the provision of information, NSAs also perform an important 
role in raising EU officials’ and policy-makers’ awareness of specific prob-
lems or issues. For example, the Israeli NGO Mossawa Center works to 
improve the status of the Arab minority in Israel and combat discrimi-
nation. Among several advocacy activities targeting the EU, it has also 
organised events in cooperation with MEPs to draw EU attention to the 
diverse issues affecting the Arab citizens of Israel or the role they (might) 
play in the peace process.55 Similarly, the public launch of the EMHRN’s 
report on the EU and the Palestinian minority in Israel provided an incen-
tive to deal with this issue in the EU-Israeli Association Council Conclu-
sions of February 2011. Although this point was already present on the 
EU’s agenda, the report contributed to further focusing attention on and 
raising awareness of the issue.56 
Besides targeting EU officials and policy-makers, some NSAs try to in-
crease awareness of certain issues among public opinion and gain popu-
lar support. This strategy57 is often used by solidarity/protest movements: 
through public campaigns they try to attract public interest and exert 
pressure on politicians for policy changes on the basis of public sup-
port. While campaigns usually take place at the national level, some are 
worldwide in scope, such as the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) 
movement campaign.58 Based on the three concepts of boycott, divestment 
and sanctions, the BDS campaign targets individuals, business groups 
and states (or international/supranational organisations) respectively 
and calls for the implementation of these measures until Israel withdraws 
from the OPTs, recognises the full equality of Arab-Israeli citizens and 
respects, protects and promotes the rights of the Palestinian refugees ac-
cording to UN resolution 194. For example, BDS supporters campaign in 
front of supermarkets in order to inform and convince people not to buy 
55.  For example, in April 2008 the Mossawa Center and MEP Luisa Morgantini organised an event entitled ‘The 
Palestinian Arab Citizens of Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Building Peace or Complicating the Conflict?’. 
See: http://www.mossawacenter.org. 
56.  EMHRN, EU and the Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel. Brussels/Copenhagen, February 2011; Interview with EU 
official, Brussels, February 2011.
57.  This is voice strategy, often in the form of ‘protest politics’. See earlier section on the lobbying/advocacy 
strategies.
58.  The BDS movement was born in 2005 following a call by Palestinian civil society organisations. It rapid-
ly spread out and now there are branches in many EU countries.(e.g. the UK, France, Italy). See also: www.
bdsmovement.net.
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the goods coming from the settlements. In other cases, they target specific 
business groups involved in the settlements such as Veolia and Alstom for 
their involvement in the tramway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. While 
actions normally take place at the national level, they are coordinated at 
the EU level in order to have a broader impact and exert pressure through 
public support. 
Setting the agenda
In addition to providing information and raising awareness, sometimes 
NSAs take part in the policy-making process by influencing the agenda-
setting stage. This means that issues of interest and concern to NSAs are 
placed on the agenda of one of the EU’s institutions, and therefore dis-
cussed. An example of this is offered by the NGO Friends of the Earth 
(FoE) Middle East, which managed to obtain a resolution by the EP on the 
situation of the Lower Jordan River.59 In 2009 the S&D (Socialists & Demo-
crats, one of the parties in the EP) organised a mission to Israel and the 
West Bank and got in touch with this NGO. Following the establishment 
of these initial contacts, in November 2009 the staff of FoE Middle East 
travelled to Brussels in order to discuss with MEPs the problems connect-
ed to the Lower Jordan River, a topic on which this NGO was working. This 
visit was followed by an S&D seminar on ‘Jordan River: Rehabilitation and 
Trust-Building’ held in June 2010 in Brussels with the participation of the 
FoE Middle East co-directors and MEPs from various political groups. The 
FoE Middle East explained to MEPs that the river would run dry by the 
end of 2011 if no action was forthcoming. By providing them with infor-
mation about this issue and by underlining the fact that the FoE Middle 
East was an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian NGO, they encouraged the EP to 
take action. The EP issued a resolution on the Lower Jordan River area, an 
important tool for the FoE Middle East, as they could use it, together with 
Resolution 378 of November 2007 by the US Congress, to lobby their own 
governments and ask them to protect the area.60 
59.  ‘European Parliament Resolution of 9 September 2010 on the Situation of the Jordan River with Special 
Regard to the Lower Jordan River Area’, 9 September 2010. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0314&format=XML&language=EN.
60.  Interview with EU official, March 2011. See also http://foeme.org/www/?module=projects&record_id=121. The 
FoE Middle East has been working on this issue and has continued to carry out advocacy activities in order to push 
the governments of the region to take action to protect the area. In 2011 the FoE Middle East received funding for 
the project All across the Jordan: Trans-boundary Master Planning of the Lower Jordan River Basin which aims at laying the 
groundwork for effective transboundary water governance for integrated water resource management. See also: 
http://www.swim-sm.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20&Itemid=14&lang=en.
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Framing issues  
NSAs also contribute to the process of issue framing, i.e. the way in which 
issues are defined and perceived, in order to shape the way in which pol-
icy-makers and officials act.61 NSAs propose their frameworks of analy-
sis and offer EU officials and policy-makers different lenses to look at 
them in different ways. Some rely on the access strategies, others engage 
officials and policy-makers in workshops and debates related to the EU’s 
policies towards Israel and the OPTs, and others present their frameworks 
through public reports and the media. 
An example of policy framing by NSAs concerns the way in which the 
Ramallah-based NGO MATTIN Group and Aprodev have framed the 
problem of settlement goods. Instead of calling for the boycott of or im-
position of sanctions on settlement products, they have focused on the 
‘territorial scope’ of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which regulates 
EU-Israeli trade. Goods traded between Israel and the EU are entitled to 
preferential treatment, i.e., they are exempted from customs duties. In ac-
cordance with international law, the EU does not consider the Occupied 
Territories as falling within Israel’s territorial scope. However, due to its 
different interpretation of what is meant by the ‘State of Israel’, Israel 
considers the settlements in the West Bank as de facto part of its territory 
and as such eligible for preferential treatment. By framing the problem 
in terms of EU and international law, the MATTIN Group and Aprodev 
maintained that, by allowing settlements goods to benefit from prefer-
ential treatment, the EU was accepting Israeli illegal application of the 
Agreement and, as a consequence, it was violating its own law, as EU in-
stitutions and Member States have legal obligations of abiding by inter-
national law, international humanitarian law, and international human 
rights, which also implies that the EU should not aid or assist any third 
party to violate them. By shifting from Israeli violations in the OPTs to 
the EU’s violations of its own law, an issue of extreme relevance to the 
EU and its institutions, the MATTIN Group/Aprodev’s objective was to 
61.  While policy framing and agenda-setting are often linked in policy analysis, they are two distinct aspects. 
Framing relates to ‘the process of selecting, emphasizing and organizing aspects of complex issues according to 
an overriding evaluative or analytical criterion’ (Falk Daviter, ‘Policy Framing in the European Union’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 14, no. 4, 2007, pp. 654-66). Agenda-setting is the process through which issues are 
placed on the (political) agenda and therefore receive attention from policy-makers or from a polity in general 
(cf. Sebastiaan Princen, Agenda-Setting in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009). Framing 
and agenda-setting are often linked, as the way in which issues are framed can be a factor contributing to plac-
ing them on the agenda. 
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induce the EU to act in compliance with international humanitarian law, 
i.e. the EU should not support, condone or neglect international humani-
tarian law violations on the ground in the context of its bilateral relation-
ship with Israel. The framework based on the ‘territorial scope’ of agree-
ments is slowly becoming part of the EU and Member States’ approach 
to analysing other agreements with Israel. As shown in the Conclusions 
of the EU-Israel Association Council in February 2011, ‘[t]he elaboration 
of an operational cooperation agreement between Israel and Europol has 
also advanced. The first comprehensive draft was submitted to Israel for 
consideration in December 2010. The necessary provisions are made for 
the correct territorial application of this and other instruments’.62 
Framing activities can also be done in a more public way, as think tanks 
usually do. An example is offered by the Israeli-European Policy Network 
(IEPN), which was established in 2003 and has been working under the 
coordination of European and Israeli scholars and practitioners. By gath-
ering researchers and experts who develop and investigate issues related 
to the EU-Israel relationship, the IEPN provides a structured forum where 
permanent links between the EU and Israel can be maintained. Its policy-
oriented work generates not only a structure for dialogue and connection, 
but it also contributes to shaping the debate in the long term. In addition 
to numerous working papers and policy proposals, the IEPN also organ-
ises conferences and workshops to promote discussion, foster debate and 
provide insights into possible solutions and options for further develop-
ments in EU-Israel relations. For example, at the beginning of November 
2011 the IEPN organised a conference on the UN recognition of the Pal-
estinian state, an occasion for experts, scholars and decision-makers to 
discuss the implications of this issue for EU foreign policy.63
Changing policies
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, some NSAs try to influence EU exter-
nal policies at later stages in the policy-making process through litigation 
strategies, i.e., legal proceedings aimed at forcing policy change. This is 
the case of Brita GmbH, a German water filtration company importing 
into the EU water-carbonating machines/drink-makers for sparkling wa-
62.  See: http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/israel/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110222_01_en.htm. 
63.  See also: http://www.iepn.org.
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ter and syrups produced by Soda Club. The issue of contention refers to 
settlement goods, as in 2002 Brita GmbH asked for preferential treatment 
for goods it had imported from Israel. While the Hauptzollamt (Customs 
office) Hamburg-Hafen provisionally accepted Brita’s application and 
granted the exemption from customs duties, it also started a verification 
procedure to identify the exact origin of the products, which, in the Haupt-
zollamt’s view, was not clear. Since Israeli authorities did not reply to this 
request, the Hauptzollamt withdrew the preferential treatment that had 
previously been granted to the goods imported by Brita GmbH due to the 
impossibility of establishing with certainty if the imported goods were 
produced under an area covered by the EU-Israel Association Agreement. 
It also sought post-clearance recovery of customs duties following the No-
tice to Importers issued by the Commission in 2001. As a consequence, 
Brita GmbH appealed to the decision to the Finanzgericht, which referred 
the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The aim was to reverse the 
decision of the customs authorities, which would have also created a prec-
edent and modified the EU’s policy with regard to the settlements and 
the territorial scope of the EU-Israeli Association Agreement. Although 
the ECJ eventually decided that the goods were not entitled to preferential 
treatment, this case shows how litigation is used by NSAs to influence EU 
policy by setting precedents that establish certain legal principles or inter-
pretations of EU law, and that can be used in subsequent cases. 
This section has presented some examples of the role played by NSAs in 
EU foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The aim has 
been to show some general trends and to highlight how NSAs try to in-
fluence the EU. These attempts occur along the entire policy cycle, with 
NSAs carrying out different activities and implementing different advo-
cacy and lobbying strategies, such as access, voice and litigation. NSAs 
intervene in the policy-making process by providing information, which 
EU officials and policy-makers can use in their work. They also draw the 
attention of EU officials and policy-makers to specific issues. Similarly, 
they try to frame problems through a certain perspective in order to pro-
mote their views and interests and place issues of their interest on the 
EU’s agenda. While this distinction into the different phases of the policy-
making process is useful from an analytical perspective, it has to be un-
derlined that these stages are not so clear-cut in practice and NSAs tend 
to work along the entire cycle. 
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conclusion
This paper has explored the role played by NSAs in EU policies towards 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In contrast with the widespread idea that 
EU external relations are an ‘off-limits’ area for NSAs, the paper has shown 
that they are part and parcel of the EU’s external policy-making process: 
not only are they involved in the implementation of policies, but they are 
extremely active on the input side as well through lobbying and advocacy 
activities. 
Starting with a mapping and typology of the NSAs relevant to this study, 
the paper has offered a lens of analysis to look at the diverse and heteroge-
neous landscape of NSAs and to highlight some trends in NSAs’ activities. 
NGOs are the most numerous and active NSAs, working on a wide variety 
of topics and issues, while business groups generally intervene in the pol-
icy-making process only when their interests are clearly at stake. Usually 
their lobbying is of a technical nature and focused on sectoral issues such 
as commercial agreements. As for solidarity/protest movements, they are 
mainly active at the national level due to the nature of their activities, 
which are based on the mobilisation of the public and on public pressure 
on governments. 
The majority of NSAs are based in the EU, although only 28 percent of 
them has an office or a full-time employee based in Brussels. Being in 
Brussels is often an advantage, as it makes it easier to carry out lobbying 
and advocacy activities targeting the EU, to be informed about what is 
happening in the EU, and to collect information about EU policies. To 
overcome the obstacle of their geographical location and to increase their 
outreach capacity, some NSAs, especially NGOs, have created networks or 
umbrella organisations in Brussels, which represent the interests of their 
members at the EU level. Moreover, many NGOs have developed differ-
ent forms of cooperation and tend to coordinate their work as much as 
possible in order to use their expertise and their resources in the most ef-
ficient way. Even if they are not in Brussels, the use of the internet has also 
made it possible for many NSAs to be visible and to communicate their 
activities and their results to a broad audience either via their website or 
by emails/mailing lists. 
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NSAs use three general approaches in their lobbying and advocacy work, 
namely access, voice and litigation. Access approaches rely on inside lob-
bying based on the exchange of relevant information outside of the pub-
lic context. In contrast, voice strategies take place in the public sphere, so 
that the interaction between the NSAs and EU officials is visible.  Finally, 
litigation approaches make use of legal means to try to bring about policy 
changes. Most NSAs tend to use different strategies at the same time as a 
way to increase their chances of success. 
Finally, the paper has offered some examples of the role that NSAs play in 
EU policy-making towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A key activity, 
which has been positively highlighted in many interviews with EU officials 
and policy-makers, is the provision of information. Due to the relatively 
small number of staff working on the Israeli-Palestinian question inside 
the EU and to the complexity of the conflict, external sources of informa-
tion are important in the policy-making process. As information is not 
neutral, especially as it is part and parcel of the conflict, officials usually 
double-check it. Nevertheless, these pieces of information often provide 
the EU with data and figures that it would be difficult to obtain otherwise 
and with an insight into what NSAs perceive as issues of concern. 
NSAs also regularly engage in activities aimed at raising the awareness of 
both the EU and public opinion concerning certain issues. On the one 
hand, this activity can be targeted at policy-makers directly by pointing 
out specific aspects and offering detailed accounts of certain issues in or-
der to shift the EU’s attention towards them, such as the issue of the Arab 
minority in Israel or that of the business groups involved in the OPTs. On 
the other hand, solidarity/protest movements try to draw public atten-
tion to specific issues by relying on campaigns to create public pressure 
on their governments. 
Evidence of NSAs’ involvement in terms of agenda-setting and framing 
activities has also been provided. While the two activities are often linked, 
the former consists in the ability of NSAs to place an issue that is of im-
portance to them on the EU’s agenda, while the latter refers to the way in 
which issues and problems are perceived and analysed. In this regard, both 
the examples of the MATTIN Group/Aprodev on the legal framing of the 
issue of the settlement goods and of the Friends of the Earth Middle East 
on the problem of the Jordan River are illustrative. Finally, some NSAs 
45
Conclusion 
work at later stages of the policy cycle (mainly through litigation strate-
gies), to bring about changes in EU policies, as the case of Brita GmbH on 
the preferential treatment for goods coming from the settlements shows.
In conclusion, even though NSAs are certainly not the only or the main 
element that determines the EU’s conduct, they are an important factor 
in the shaping and making of EU policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Knowing who they are and how they work increases our under-
standing of the EU’s policy-making process.  
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abbreviations
ACAA  Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial  
   Products
BDS  Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions 
CIDSE  Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité  
   (International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity)
CSO  Civil Society Organisation
DG RELEX Directorate General for External Relations
ECCP  European Coordination of Committees and Associations for Palestine
ECJ  European Court of Justice
EEAS  European External Action Service
EFD  Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group
EIDHR  European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EMHRN  Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network
EMP  Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP  European Neighbourhood Policy
EP  European Parliament
FIDH   Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme  
   (International Federation for Human Rights)
FoE  Friends of the Earth
GUE/NGL  European United Left/Nordic Green Left
HoM  Heads of Mission
IEPN  Israeli-European Policy Network
MEP  Member of the European Parliament
MEPP  Middle East Peace Process
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NSA  Non-State Actor
OPTs  Occupied Palestinian Territories
PA  Palestinian Authority
PLO  Palestinian Liberation Organisation
UfM  Union for the Mediterranean
UN  United Nations
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